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Local Fiscal Strategies in the Netherlands:
An Empirical Analysis
MATTHEUS C.  WASSENAAR and
DAAN P.  VAN SOEST
One of the most important possible sources of conflict of interest
between central and local governments is difference in political
preferences with respect to, for example, income redistribution. If
local governments are of a different political composition than the
central government, they may be inclined to reinforce or weaken
the redistribution policies as pursued by the central government.
We empirically test whether local governments in the Netherlands
do pursue income redistribution policies over and above the
central government’s redistribution policy and we find that the
distribution of the local tax burden over the various household
types differs according to the political composition of the local
council.
The relationship between the central and local governments is a delicate
one. From the central government’s point of view decentralisation is a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, local governments are often thought to be
better equipped to tailor their policies, both in terms of taxation and
spending, to the local circumstances (such as the age composition of the
population in the jurisdiction, local unemployment rates, etc.).1 On the other
hand, however, delegating decision-making to the local level gives rise to
the possibility of local representatives expressing their own political
preferences, which may or may not coincide with those of the central
government (Goldsmith and Newton, 1983; Newton and Karran, 1985:
Ch.5).2 Indeed, local governments may be of a different political
composition than the coalition at the central level and hence can be inclined
to reinforce or weaken policies as pursued by the central government.3 Even
though local authorities may appropriately represent the preferences of the
majority of the inhabitants in their jurisdictions, intragenerational fairness
and equity are at stake at the national level if local preferences do not
coincide with the nation’s preferences with respect to income (in)equality
(Stewart, 1983). 
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The extent to which local governments are able to exercise their own
political preferences has been researched extensively in the literature,
focusing on either local government spending or taxation (Bailey, 1999;
Clark and Ferguson, 1981; Cullis and Jones, 1998; Foster, et al., 1980;
Oates, 1972; Sharp, 1984; Sharpe and Newton, 1984; Tiebout, 1956).
Indeed, there is substantial empirical evidence that the political composition
of the local (as well as central) government is correlated with tax rate levels
as is evidenced by, for example, Abrams and Dougan (1986), Allers et al.
(2001), Ashworth and Heyndels (1997), Borge (1995), Merrifield (2000)
and Reid (1998). These studies found a positive correlation between the
level of tax rates and the relative strength of left-wing parties in (local)
government. Government expenditures are also found to be correlated with
the political composition of the coalition in power: left-wing governments
are found to spend more in order to pursue political objectives such as
provision of social safety (Goldsmith and Newton, 1983; Sharpe and
Newton, 1984). 
Acknowledging the important work that has been done on the
relationship between political composition of local councils and the level of
either local taxes or expenditures, we aim to contribute to the empirical
literature by analysing the relationship between the council’s political
composition and the distribution of the tax burden over the various
household types. In most countries political parties disagree as to the
optimal amount of income redistribution and hence local governments may
be expected to impose their own political preferences with respect to
income equality by setting different local tax rates for the various types of
income groups in their jurisdiction, thus either weakening or reinforcing the
income distribution policy as pursued by the central government.
This article aims to empirically analyse whether local governments in
the Netherlands are indeed inclined to use tax policies to affect the income
distribution in their jurisdiction. We combine information on the political
composition of Dutch municipality councils with information on the spread
of local tax burdens over the various household types. Three types of tax are
levied by Dutch municipalities, one of which is (at least indirectly) related
to household wealth, although the other two are not. By keeping the two
wealth-independent taxes relatively low and choosing high rates for the
wealth-dependent tax, the local councils are able to affect the income
distribution in their jurisdiction. Clearly not all differences in the amounts
of tax paid by the various household types can be exclusively attributed to
differences in political stance with respect to income and/or wealth
redistribution policies. Indeed, cost considerations and the necessity to raise
government income are also likely to affect both the tax level and the spread
of tax burdens over households. Controlling for such considerations we test
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whether the (in)equality of the distribution of local taxes over various
income groups in the Netherlands is at least partly determined by the
political composition of the municipality council and find that the spread in
tax burdens over the various kinds of households is indeed (at least partly)
determined by the local government’s political composition.
The second section of the article sketches the role of municipalities in
the Dutch fiscal landscape, indicating the extent to which they enjoy
political autonomy. The structure of local municipality taxes in the
Netherlands is discussed in more detail in section three. The fourth section
presents the data, whereas the results of the regression analyses are shown
in section five. Conclusions ensue in the sixth section.
THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands is a unitary state with three levels of government: a central
government, 12 provinces and 548 municipalities (situation in 1998). Some
insight into the relative importance of these three layers of government can
be obtained by comparing their shares in Dutch Gross Domestic Product
(GDP): in 1998, the central government covered about 30 per cent of GDP
whereas the respective shares of the provinces and municipalities were 1.5
per cent and eight per cent. Apart from the fact that municipalities account
for about one-fifth of total government spending, they also play an
important role in Dutch government because they enjoy a substantial
amount of autonomy both with respect to both spending and taxation (Allers
et al., 2001).4 The main governing body in municipalities is the council. The
municipality council is chaired by the Mayor who is appointed by the
central government, but whose executive powers are very limited. Actual
political power is in the hands of the council’s members who are elected
directly for a period of four years on the basis of proportional
representation. The main tasks of municipalities are in the realm of social
security, education, public transport, environmental planning, household
refuse collection and construction and maintenance of the sewerage system.
However, municipalities do have the political freedom to pursue other
objectives, such as income redistribution. Indeed the average municipality
tax rates (as percentage of net disposable household income) do differ
substantially between jurisdictions (see below and Table 2). 
The central government acknowledges the municipalities’ actual
political power and historically has tried to reduce their influence in various
ways, including centralisation of taxation. Rather than allowing local
authorities to raise their own funds through levying local taxes, the central
government limits the municipalities’ discretion by raising taxes itself and
subsequently allocating part of the tax revenues to the municipalities.
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Indeed in 1998 more than 80 per cent of the local authorities’ budget
consisted of funds allocated to the municipalities by the government (of
which more than half is earmarked for specific expenditures, thus imposing
additional restrictions on municipality policy). The contribution of local
taxes to the municipality budget was only about 9.5 per cent whereas
charges and fees covered 8.1 per cent (Ministry of Finance, 1998a).
Furthermore, the central government’s concern with respect to local
political power is evidenced by the fact that the central government annually
monitors the level of local taxation, the distribution of the taxes over the
various types of households and also the differences in tax levels between
jurisdictions (Allers, 1996; Ministry of Finance, 1998b).
From this discussion it is clear that the central government is concerned
with (interjurisdictional differences in) local taxation, but that it is only able
to affect the local tax structure indirectly. Indeed the degree of municipality
discretion with respect to local taxation is mainly determined by Dutch
fiscal law, which will be discussed in the next section. 
THE MUNICIPALITY TAX STRUCTURE IN THE NETHERLANDS
In the Dutch fiscal structure, municipalities are entitled to levy three types
of tax: property tax, refuse collection rates and sewerage charges (De Kam,
1998; Ministry of Finance, 1998a; OECD, 1999). Fiscal laws in the
Netherlands leave local policy-makers at least some discretion with respect
to the specific rates they charge to the various types of households in their
jurisdiction. Therefore, municipality councils can pursue local objectives by
varying the rates for each of the three tax bases.
The property tax is levied on the imputed (market) value of the house,
hence the amount of tax a household has to pay is associated with its wealth.
Both owner and occupant are charged a certain percentage of the value of
the property. Although the Dutch fiscal laws do not impose a specific
maximum on either the property tax rate or its revenues, the tax charged to
the owner cannot exceed the occupant’s tax rate by more than 25 per cent. 
The objective of the refuse collection charge is to cover (part of) the
household refuse removal costs. The Dutch fiscal laws impose a maximum
with respect to this tax base: its revenues should not exceed the costs
incurred for removing household waste. The refuse collection charge is
independent of the value of the property, but does in some cases vary as a
function of the number of household members.
The revenues obtained through sewerage charges are also capped by the
total costs of maintaining the sewerage system. As in the case of property
tax, the charges are split between the owner of the house and the occupant.
As in the case of the household refuse collection charge, the sewerage
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charge may depend on the number of household members, but it is
independent of the value of the household’s property. In most
municipalities, either the owner or the occupant is charged for the property
being connected to the sewerage system, but not both.
Municipalities are autonomous in determining which of the three taxes
they impose and are to a certain extent free to set the tax levels. Although the
central government is the main actor pursuing income-redistribution policies
in the Netherlands (through the implementation of income and wealth taxes),
Dutch municipalities are able to strengthen or weaken income redistribution
through the relative distribution of the property tax rates and the relative
value of the sewerage and refuse collection charges as compared to the
property tax rates. For example, if a local council aims to achieve a more
egalitarian income distribution than the one that results from the central
government’s tax policies, it would choose relatively low levels of the refuse
collection rate and sewerage charges (possibly zero) and make the household
property tax rate relatively high. Alternatively, setting the wealth-
independent taxes at their maximum level and choosing a low rate for the
property tax can increase the skewedness of the local income distribution.
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
To analyse the relationship between the political composition of the city
council and the distribution of the local tax burdens over the various
household types, we used information from two data sources: the local tax
burden survey as undertaken by the Netherlands’ Ministry of Finance
(1998b) and the Central Bureau of Statistics’ (1994) voters survey. The
latter data set contains information on the voters’ perceptions of the relative
weight that the various political parties assign to income equality as a policy
objective. This survey was conducted at the time of the 1994 parliamentary
elections. Political parties were ranked from one to seven, from those for
whom income redistribution is not an important issue to those that propose
to actively pursue an income redistribution policy (see Table 1). These
survey data have been used to construct a political composition index that
reflects the weight each of the 548 Dutch municipalities’ local councils
attach to inequality of wealth or income. This political composition index is
calculated as the weighted average value of party representation in local
councils on 1 January 1998.
The other data set used in this analysis is the local tax burden poll, a
questionnaire that was sent to all municipalities in the Netherlands in order
to collect information on the tariffs and tax base for each of the three local
taxes for the year 1998 (Ministry of Finance, 1998b). Of the 548 Dutch
municipalities, 485 returned the questionnaire, hence the survey suffered
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93LOCAL FISCAL STRATEGIES IN THE NETHERLANDS
from a non-response of slightly more than ten per cent. Municipalities are
not homogenous in terms of the composition of their housing stock or in
terms of characteristics of their residents. To ensure comparability between
municipalities, we define eight types of households, based on household
size, the imputed (market) value of the property and the occupant’s legal
status. A distinction is made between single and multiple person
households. The imputed property value is also a dichotomous variable,
indicating whether the property’s market value is close to either 150,000 or
to 280,000 Dutch guilders.5 The occupant’s status is either tenant or owner,
hence the house is either rented or owner-occupied. 
On the basis of these characteristics, summarised in the first four
columns of Table 2, we can determine the municipality tax burden for each
of the eight types of household. The average annual amounts (in Dutch
guilders) levied for property taxation, refuse collection and sewerage
charges are presented in columns five to seven. As this table illustrates,
independent of the value of the house, property taxes are more than twice as
high for owner-occupants than for tenants. Furthermore, property taxes do
not depend of the number of household members. Comparing the amounts
TABLE 1
PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION ISSUES IN POLITICAL
PARTIES’ OBJECTIVES a
Party Value
Small left-wing parties 6.5
GroenLinks (Green Party) 5.9
PvdA (Social Democrats) 5.3
D66 (Liberal Democrats) 4.6
CDA (Christian Democrats) 4.3
VVD (Conservative Party) 3.2
AOV/Unie 55+ (Senior Citizens’ Party) 5.0
SGP/GPV/RPF (Religious Right) 4.7
Left-wing local partiesb 5.5
Local partiesb 4.5
Right-wing local partiesb 3.5
Average value 4.5
Notes: a. Values in this table show the opinion of each political party on the statement about
income policy on a scale from one to seven. The value of ‘1’ means the party wants to
increase the differences in income level. The value of ‘7’ means that the party would like
to decrease these differences.
b. As a result of the scope of the National Survey of Voting Behaviour (which was aimed
at analysing national elections), no score is available for a few local parties in this survey.
For these parties, we determined values based on the average stance of the nation-wide
parties. For local parties without a clear left- or right-wing signature, we used the nation’s
average value of 4.5. Local left-wing parties were assigned the national average value
plus one (i.e., 5.5), whereas local right-wing parties were assigned the national average
score minus one (thus, their value was set at 3.5).
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TABLE 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EIGHT HOUSEHOLD TYPES
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Household Household Property Legal status Property Refuse collection Sewerage Sum of all Municipality taxes as a percentage
type number size value occupant tax bill charge charge municipality of net disposable income
taxes
1 Single 150,000 Rented 213 329 77 620 2.8%
(74) (88) (95) (148) (0.7%)
2 Single 150,000 Owner- 477 329 162 973 4.5%
occupied (165) (88) (87) (191) (0.9%)
3 Family 150,000 Rented 213 401 91 705 2.5%
(74) (91) (105) (152) (0.5%)
4 Family 150,000 Owner- 477 401 176 1,059 3.7%
occupied (65) (91) (91) (179) (0.6%)
5 Single 280,000 Rented 397 329 77 805 1.4%
(138) (88) (94) (179) (0.3%)
6 Single 280,000 Owner- 890 329 161 1,381 2.3%
occupied (308) (88) (87) (34) (0.5%)
7 Family 280,000 Rented 397 401 91 890 1.4%
(138) (91) (105) (176) (0.3%)
8 Family 280,000 Owner- 890 401 176 1,467 2.3%
occupied (308) (91) (91) (298) (0.5%)
Note:    Monetary values in 1998 Dutch guilders; standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
Source: Ministry of Finance, 1998b.
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of money to be collected for property taxes and refuse collection, tenants’
property taxes are either lower or approximately equal to the amounts raised
by the refuse collection charges, whereas the former exceed the latter in case
of owner-occupied houses. The reason for this is that the property tax does
discriminate between tenants and owner-occupiers whereas refuse
collection rates only depend on household size. The sewerage charges are
also independent of the value of the house, but are determined by household
size and the legal status of the occupant. In general, the sewerage charges
are substantially lower than the other two taxes.
Adding up the amounts of taxes paid by the various household types for
each of the three tax bases discussed above, we calculate the ratio of the tax
burdens paid by the occupants of cheaper properties to those paid by the
occupants of the more expensive houses in each of the 485 municipalities in
the data set. These ratios will serve as dependent variables in the regression
equations presented in the fifth section. In the eighth column of Table 2, the
average differences in terms of the total tax burden are presented along with
their standard deviations. The total amount of taxes paid is found to vary
substantially depending on the type of household considered and the value
of the house. In general, the average owner-occupants are found to pay
between 1.50 and 1.71 times as much tax as tenants, depending on whether
we consider single households in relatively cheap or more expensive
houses. The total average tax burden for expensive houses (imputed value
of 280,000 Dutch guilders) exceeds the total tax burden of cheaper houses
(with a value of 150,000 guilders) by a factor of between 1.26 (for families
in rented houses) and 1.42 (for single owner-occupied households). The
differences in tax bills are much smaller when comparing single versus
multiple person households. The tax bill for families exceeds that of one-
person households by a factor ranging from 1.06 (for expensive owner-
occupied houses) to 1.14 (for cheaper rented houses). 
From the standard deviations presented in parenthesis in Table 2 it is
clear that the actual tax burdens (i.e., the three specific as well as the total
tax burdens) vary considerably across municipalities. This conclusion is
reinforced when looking at relative tax rates as opposed to absolute tax
burdens. In the ninth column of Table 2 the municipality tax rates are
presented as a percentage of net disposable household income and the
standard deviations indicate that these also differ substantially between the
various household types.
Our aim is to test whether local councils pursue redistributive income
policies over and above those implemented by the central government.
However, in order to determine the impact of the local councils’ political
composition on the ratios of the total tax burdens we need to control for
other factors that may cause the amounts of taxes levied to differ between
95LOCAL FISCAL STRATEGIES IN THE NETHERLANDS
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the various types of households in a municipality. The main mechanism to
consider is that Dutch local tax structure is such that revenue-raising
arguments result in larger differences in tax burdens. If higher tax revenues
are called for, the caps imposed on the refuse collection rate and the
sewerage charges imply that the property tax rates should be increased
(Sterks and Allers, 1998). This, in turn, increases the differences in tax
burdens among households that differ in terms of wealth.
Therefore, to isolate the difference in tax burdens arising from purely
redistributive motifs as compared to those resulting from tax-raising
policies, we control for the latter. Apart from political preferences for higher
per capita tax burdens (also captured by the political composition variable),
three additional reasons for revenue-raising policies are identified. 
First, previous research shows that the level of per-capita tax burden is
positively correlated with the number of inhabitants in a municipality due to
diseconomies of scale (for evidence using Dutch data, see Allers et al.,
2001; Ladd, 1994, finds similar results using data for US counties).
Therefore, we include the number of inhabitants in a municipality as an
explanatory variable. 
Second, in case of financial mismanagement the central government can
force municipalities to improve their financial situation. In return for
receiving a grant to cover (part of) its expenses, the municipality should
meet special requirements with respect to the various tax rates it levies. The
sewerage charges and the refuse collection rates should be such that all
expenses on waste removal are covered and the property taxes should be at
least 40 per cent higher than the national average. The spread in household
tax burdens in municipalities that are subject to this arrangement can be
expected to be higher than the national average because the requirements on
the property taxes are more strict than those on the sewerage charges and the
refuse collection rates. This financial restructuring instrument is known as
Article 12 of the Financial Relationship Act and a dummy variable is
constructed that has the value of ‘1’ for the municipalities that had an
Article 12-arrangement in the period 1991–98.6
The third relevant factor is the quality of the stock of houses in the
municipality under consideration. Controlling for municipality size, a
relatively low average value of the property in a jurisdiction that the local
council needs to impose a higher property tax rate for the same level of tax
receipts. 
REGRESSION RESULTS
Combining the information on the household-specific tax burden, the
municipality political composition index and the municipality-specific
96 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES
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97LOCAL FISCAL STRATEGIES IN THE NETHERLANDS
controls, we are able to analyse whether local councils actively pursue
redistribution policies, according to their political composition. Local
governments aiming to pursue an income redistribution policy over and
above that of the central government will try to make the household tax bill
an increasing function of household wealth, for which the household’s
property value can be expected to be a reasonable indicator. The dependent
variable in the regression analysis is the ratio of the tax burdens of
households living in a house with a value of 150,000 Dutch guilders to the
burden of households occupying houses worth 280,000 guilders. We
investigate this relationship between the tax burden ratio and the political
composition index for each of four types of households: single persons in
rented houses, single persons in owner-occupied houses, families in rented
houses and families in owner-occupied houses.7 The results of these
regression analyses are presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX BURDEN RATIO FOR HOUSEHOLDS OCCUPYING A
LOWER OR HIGHER VALUE PROPERTY
Single person Single person Multiple person Multiple person
household, household, household, household,
tenant owner tenant owner
Average tax burden:
Property value, Dfl. 150,000 620 973 705 1,059
Property value, Dfl. 280,000 805 1,381 890 1,467
Average ratio 0.770 0.704 0.792 0.722
Estimation results:
Constant 1.032 0.885 0.985 0.868
(16.600) (16.286) (17.187) (16.207)
Political composition 
of local council -0.063 -0.048 -0.050 -0.043
(-4.889) (-4.212) (-4.228) (-3.825)
Inhabitants (in 10,000) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-2.973) (-1.571) (-4.009) (-2.577)
Article 12 -0.037 -0.032 -0.037 -0.034
(-4.140) (-4.170) (-4.501) (-4.413)
Average property value
(in Dfl. 100,000) 0.028 0.029 0.035 0.037
(6.061) (7.169) (8.253) (9.472)
R2(adj.) 0.283 0.280 0.349 0.357
F-value 49.629 48.443 66.664 68.016
Number of observations 485 485 485 485
Note: T-values in parentheses.
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For each of the four household types, the relationship between the ratio
of the tax burdens and the political composition of the local council is found
to be negative and significant: the more left-wing the local council’s
coalition (that is, the higher the value of the index), the lower the ratio of
the total tax burdens of the relatively poor households to that of the more
affluent households. Left-wing councils achieve their objectives by keeping
the refuse collection and sewerage charges relatively low and by setting a
relatively high level of property taxes. Therefore, the revenues from refuse
collection taxes and sewerage charges in these municipalities only cover
part of the actual service costs.
In general, the other explanatory variables have a significant relationship
with the tax burden ratio and the signs are as expected in all four regression
equations. The more inhabitants in the jurisdiction, the lower the tax burden
of households living in the relatively cheap houses compared to those in the
more expensive ones. We also find that municipalities subject to
government supervision as a result of (past) financial mismanagement
(Article 12) generally impose higher property taxes, thus resulting in a
larger spread in tax burdens. Finally, the higher the average value of the
stock of houses in a jurisdiction, the lower the tax rate of the property taxes
and hence the smaller the difference between the tax burdens.
CONCLUSIONS
In both the theoretical and empirical literature, the relationship between the
central and local governments has been researched extensively, emphasising
the sources of possible conflict of interest. Income redistribution is one of
those important political issues for which party preferences differ widely.
As local governments may be of a different political composition than the
central government’s coalition, local authorities may be inclined to
reinforce or weaken the redistribution policies pursued by the central
government. Indeed, given the proportional representation in municipality
councils, such differences may appropriately reflect the preferences of the
majority of the jurisdictions’ inhabitants, but may be in conflict with the
nation’s preferences (as represented by the central government) with respect
to equity and fairness.
This article contributes to the literature by empirically analysing the
impact of political factors on the distribution of local tax burdens over
various types of households in the Netherlands. The results show that in
municipalities with a left-wing local council, the differences in tax burden
between occupants of lower- and higher-valued houses are larger than in
municipalities with a right-wing local council. Thus, we find that local
governments in the Netherlands thwart the redistribution policy of the
central government, at least to some extent. 
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NOTES
1. Examples are discussed in various papers in Young (1983). However, Newton (1982) argues
that the democratic merits of small units of local government are generally exaggerated as
compared to the democratic qualities of larger units. This implies that local governments may
not necessarily be the only institution capable of meeting local needs.
2. However, note that the local politicians’ room for manoeuvre is limited by the extent to
which agents (households or firms) are inclined to migrate out of their jurisdiction when
dissatisfied with the policies pursued. See, for example, Sharp (1984) and Tiebout (1956).
For an overview, see Sharpe and Newton (1984: Ch.3).
3. For an international comparison of the role of local governments in various countries, see
Norton (1994).
4. Obviously, provinces also play a role in the Dutch political landscape. As the meso level is
beyond the scope of this article, we refer to Toonen (1993) for an excellent overview of the
role of provinces in the Netherlands. 
5. The property values of 150,000 and 280,000 Dutch guilders are the same as used in Dutch
income policy to analyse the effects of (redistributive) policy measures and (exogenous)
economic developments on the income of different types of households.
6. According to the Financial Relationship Act, only municipalities that had an Article 12-grant
in 1998 were obliged to comply with the requirements of the Article 12-Act in 1998.
However, history has shown that former so-called Article 12-municipalities are not able to
lower the tax rates directly after their Article 12-period has expired.
7. In addition to these four regressions, we can also determine the impact of the political
composition index on the ratio of total tax bills of single to multiple person households and
the ratio of total tax bills of tenants to those of owner-occupiers. However, as these analyses
more accurately measure differences in political preferences with respect to family values
and house ownership, we do not pursue them. 
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